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Abstract : The aim of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that luck is a risk-involving phenomenon. I                                   
start by explaining why this hypothesis is prima facie plausible in view of the parallelisms between luck                                 
and risk. I then distinguish three ways to spell it out: in probabilistic terms, in modal terms, and in                                     
terms of lack of control. Before evaluating the resulting accounts, I explain how the idea that luck                                 
involves risk is compatible with the fact that risk concerns unwanted events whereas luck can concern                               
both wanted and unwanted events. I turn to evaluating the modal and probabilistic views and argue,                               
firstly, that they fail to account for the connection between risk and bad luck; secondly, that they also                                   
fail to account for the connection between risk and good luck. Finally, I defend the lack of control                                   
view. In particular, I argue that it can handle the objections to the probabilistic and modal accounts                                 
and  that  it  can  explain  how  degrees  of  luck  and  risk  covary. 
4th of July of 1943, 11:07 pm. A Consolidated B-24 Liberator takes off from Gibraltar Airport. It                                 
carries Władysław Sikorski, the commander-in-chief of the Polish Army and the Prime Minister of                           
the Polish government-in-exile. Sixteen seconds after takeoff the aircraft crashes into the sea.                         
Sikorski  dies  along  with  ten  other  people.  The  pilot,  Flight  Lieutenant  Eduard  Prchal,  survives.  
Later investigations of this World War II event failed to pin down the specific cause of the                                 
accident, but it is believed that the elevator system of the aircraft was jammed. Prchal’s efforts to                                 
move the stick of the steering mechanism were all in vain. He could not pull up and the plane lost                                       
height  quickly.  Inevitably,  it  ended  in  the  waters  of  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar. 
Prchal’s lucky survival and events alike suggest that there is a close connection between luck                             
and risk. For a lot of risk is involved in taking off in an aircraft whose elevator system is jammed,                                       
and a lot of luck is involved if that risk is materialized, the aircraft crashes and yet one survives                                     
against all odds. Indeed, cases of this sort give prima facie reason to think that luck is a                                   
risk-involving  phenomenon.  In  this  paper,  I  aim  to  explore  this  hypothesis. 
Here is the plan. In §1, I will take a closer look at the luck as risk hypothesis in the light of                                           
the parallelisms between both phenomena and introduce three ways to spell it out: in probabilistic                             
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terms, in modal terms, and in terms of lack of control. In §2, I will explain how luck can be naturally                                         
understood as a risk-involving phenomenon even if luck and risk are different—especially in view of                             
the fact that risk concerns unwanted events, whereas luck can concern both wanted and unwanted                             
events. In §3, I will criticize the modal and the probabilistic models of the luck as risk hypothesis. I                                     
will argue, firstly, that they fail to account for the connection between risk and bad luck; secondly,                                 
that they also fail to account for the connection between risk and good luck. In §4, I will defend the                                       
lack of control view. In particular, I will argue that it can handle the objections to the probabilistic                                   
and  modal  views  and  that  it  can  explain  how  degrees  of  luck  and  risk  covary. 
1.  The  luck  as  risk  hypothesis 
Luck is a phenomenon that is attributed  post hoc , i.e., to events that have occurred. Risk, by contrast,                                   
is attributed  a priori  (i.e., before the fact) and thus applies to potential events. In view of this, the luck                                       
as risk hypothesis cannot be simply that luck and risk are the same phenomenon, but that luck is                                   
risk-involving,  in  the  sense  that  some  kind  of  risk  always  precedes  luck. 
That there is some interesting connection between luck and risk is evident if we consider                             
cases like Prchal’s survival. But there are at least two further theoretical considerations that also lend                               
support to this connection. The first is a distinction that applies to both luck and risk, which is often                                     
overlooked in ordinary parlance. The second is the fact that degrees of luck and risk covary. Let’s                                 
start  with  the  first.  
Luck and risk come in two guises. Sometimes, we talk of luck as a non-relational property of                                 
events. Consider lucky shots, lucky guesses or lucky discoveries: they all instantiate the property of                             
being by luck. This is what we may call the  non-relational sense of luck —strictly speaking, it is the actual                                     
occurrence of an event that is considered a matter of luck. But sometimes (actually most of the                                 
times) we talk of luck as if it established a relation between an agent and an event. For example, we                                       
say things such as ‘Prchal was lucky to survive the accident’, ‘Sophie was lucky to hit the mark’ or                                     
‘James was lucky to guess the answer’. In these cases, it is an agent who instantiates the relational                                   
property  of  being  lucky  with  respect  to  the  occurrence  of  an  event.  This  is  the  relational  sense  of  luck .  1
1 Some luck attributions are of the form ‘Event E is lucky for agent S’ (e.g., ‘Surviving the accident was lucky for Prchal’).                                             
This suggests that luck in the relational sense can be also understood as a relational property of events with respect to                                         
agents.  See  Broncano-Berrocal  (2016)  and  Milburn  (2014)  for  further  discussion  on  this  distinction. 
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Exactly the same distinction applies to risk. An event may be risky in the sense that it is at                                     
risk of occurring. Let’s call this the  non-relational sense of risk —strictly speaking, it is the possible                               
occurrence of an event that instantiates the property of being at risk of being materialized. But we                                 
also talk of risk as establishing a relation between an agent and an event. For example, we say things                                     
such as 'Jane is crazy to play Russian roulette, she is at serious risk of death’ or ‘Max has left the king                                           
unprotected, he risks losing the chess game’. Here the agents in question instantiate the relational                             
property of being at risk with respect to the possible occurrence of an event (e.g., dying, losing). This                                   
is  the  relational  sense  of  risk .   2
The second parallelism between luck and risk is that  degrees of luck and risk covary . Consider                               
non-relational luck and risk. Playing Russian roulette with a six-shot revolver loaded with five bullets                             
is riskier than playing with the same revolver but loaded with one bullet. In addition, surviving the                                 
former game is unsurprisingly luckier than surviving the latter. This lends support to the following                             
thesis: 
Non-Relational Risk-Luck Gradability Correspondence : The more risk there is that an event E will                           
occur,  the  luckier  it  is  that  E  does  not  occur.   3
Consider the previous example: the more risk there is that a Russian roulette player will die, the                                 
luckier  it  is  that  she  survives.  
The same point about gradability applies to relational luck and risk. A Russian roulette player                             
pulling the trigger of a six-shot revolver that is loaded with five bullets is at more risk of dying than a                                         
player who shoots the same revolver with only one bullet in the chamber. Correspondingly, the                             
former player is luckier than the latter if both survive. Again, this makes the following connecting                               
thesis  plausible: 
Relational Risk-Luck Gradability Correspondence : The more at risk an agent S is with respect to                             
the  possible  occurrence  of  an  event  E,  the  luckier  S  is  that  E  does  not  occur. 
These two para llelisms (the relational/non-relational distinction and the gradability correspondence)                   
suggest that luck relates to risk in an interesting way. However, this is not sufficient to secure the                                   
2  See  Broncano-Berrocal  (2016)  for  further  discussion  of  this  distinction.  
3  For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  here  and  in  what  follows  I  will  omit  time  indexes. 
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plausibility of the luck as risk hypothesis. What would really render the idea that luck is a                                 
risk-involving phenomenon plausible would be the fact that same sort of conditions featured by                           
accounts of luck can be also intuitively replicated as conditions on risk. If this were the case, we                                   
would have enough motivation to deem the luck as risk hypothesis something more than a mere                               
working  hypothesis.  But  before  entering  into  details,  two  caveats  are  in  order.  
Firstly, my focus will be on relational luck only. The reason is not just simplicity, but also the                                   
fact that the relational sense of luck is the most common one in ordinary parlance, i.e., more often                                   
we attribute luck to agents in connection to events (or to events in connection with agents) than to                                   
(the  occurrence  of)  events  simpliciter .  Correspondingly,  I  will  only  focus  on  relational  risk. 
Secondly, the project of this paper is to distinguish plausible ways to spell out the luck as risk                                   
hypothesis. I am not interested in judging whether the different available views on luck and risk that                                 
will serve to model luck as a risk-involving phenomenon are individually correct  qua  accounts of luck                               
or risk. That is, I will be only concerned with investigating to which extent it is plausible to claim                                     4
that, for a given condition (or set of conditions) C on luck, a significant event E is lucky for an agent                                         
S if only if an analogous condition (or set of conditions) for risk C* also holds for E and S. The                                         
methodological approach will be the following: the resulting luck-as-risk views will be deemed                         
plausible if the relevant conditions they feature on luck (C) and risk (C*) go hand-in-hand, i.e., if                                 
there is no case in which C holds, but C* doesn’t, or the other way around—in §3, we will see that                                         
two prima facie plausible views actually fall prey to this sort of counterexample. Without further ado,                               
let’s  start  with  the  first  way  to  model  luck  as  a  risk-involving  phenomenon. 
A natural way to understand the nature of luck is  in probabilistic terms . Suppose that you win a                                   
lottery with long odds. Given the odds, the fact that you have won was very improbable. This                                 
suggests that a significant event is lucky for an agent if only if it was improbable. There are of                                     5
course several ways to cash out this view depending on how the notion of probability is interpreted                                 
and on how many further constraints one includes in it. For example, the relevant probability of                               
occurrence might be interpreted objectively, as a subjective expectation (a credence), might be                         
conditionalized on one’s evidence, on one’s knowledge, on whether or not one is in a position to                                 
4  See  Broncano-Berrocal  (2016)  for  a  comprehensive  review. 
5 Here and in what follows, I will talk of  significant events. The reason is that, when it is relational luck and risk we are                                                 
talking about, an event does not count as lucky or risky for an agent unless it is significant to the agent. See §2 for                                               
discussion  of  the  significance  condition. 
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know that the event in question will occur, and so on. All these are valid ways to understand the                                     
nature  of  luck  in  probabilistic  terms.   6
The interesting point, however, is that the nature of risk can be also plausibly understood                             
probabilistically. Suppose that you participate in a lottery in which you will die unless your ticket is                                 
the winner. There is a high risk of death and one explanation of this is that dying is very probable                                       
given the odds. So, in general, a plausible view of risk is that a significant event is risky for an agent if                                           
only  if  its  occurrence  is  probable.   7
This automatically connects (probabilistically construed) luck with (probabilistically               
construed) risk. It seems that if an agent S is lucky that an event E occurs (e.g., surviving) it is                                       
because not-E (e.g., not surviving, i.e., dying) was risky for S in the first place, and this means that E                                       
was very likely. So luck would be risk-involving in precisely this sense. By way of illustration, imagine                                 
that you survive the aforementioned deadly lottery because your ticket is the winner. The reason why                               
you are lucky to survive is that there was high probability (i.e., high risk) that you would die. We may                                       
label  this  view  luck  as  probabilistic  risk  or  L-R Prob   for  short. 
A quite popular alternative to the probabilistic model is to understand luck in modal terms .                             
The idea is that a significant event is lucky for an agent if only if the event is such that it effectively                                           
occurs but could easily have failed to occur. In possible worlds talk, this view can be formulated as                                   
follows: E is lucky for S if only if E occurs in the actual world and in most nearby possible worlds in                                           
which the initial conditions for E are the same as in the actual world, E does not occur. Consider a                                       
fair  lottery.  In  most  nearby  possible  worlds  participants  lose.  That’s  why  winners  are  lucky.  8
Risk can be naturally explained in the same terms. Consider the deadly lottery again.                           
Participants are at a serious risk of death. In modal terms, this can be put as follows: they risk dying                                       
because in most possible worlds where they hold a lottery ticket (i.e., in very similar circumstances to                                 
the  actual  ones)  they  would  die.   9
6  See  Broncano-Berrocal  (2016)  for  a  review. 
7 This view roughly corresponds to the notion of risk in science and contexts of decision-making. See Möller (2012) for                                       
discussion of the latter. See also Broncano-Berrocal (2015) and Pritchard (2015) for further discussion on probabilistic                               
risk. 
8  The  modal  account  of  luck  has  been  most  prominently  defended  by  Pritchard  (2005;  2014). 
9  See  Pritchard  (2015)  for  this  kind  of  account  of  risk. 
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Once luck and risk are understood in modal terms, the two notions seem to go                             
hand-in-hand. As in the case of L-R Prob , the idea is to explain the fact that an agent S is lucky that a                                           
significant event E occurs (e.g., surviving) in terms of not-E (e.g., dying) being risk for S before E’s                                   
occurrence. In modal terms this would translate as the simple idea that S is lucky that E because E                                     
would fail to occur in most nearby possible worlds. Let’s call this view  luck as modal risk or L-R Mod for                                       
short. 
The final intuitive way to understand luck is  in terms of lack of control . Consider Prchal’s lucky                                 
survival. A key factor is that he lacked control over the aircraft, in particular what was beyond his                                   
control was the fact that he would survive the takeoff. In normal conditions where pilots can handle                                 
the steering mechanism of their aircrafts, surviving a takeoff is something they have control over,                             
and moreover, something that it is not a matter of luck for them. This lends support to the following                                     
view: a significant event E is lucky for an agent S if only if S lacks control over E (alternatively, just                                         
in case E is beyond S’s control). There are of course several ways to interpret the relevant notion of                                     
control. But it suffices for present purposes to understand it pre-theoretically (I will elaborate on                             10
the  notion  of  control  in  §4). 
The interesting point is that lack of control is also a plausible way to account for risk. Before                                   
crashing, Prchal was at a high risk of death. This is plausibly explained by the fact that he lacked                                     
control over the steering mechanism, since the elevation system of the aircraft was jammed.                           
Generalizing, the view would be that a significant event E is risky for an agent S if only if S lacks                                         
control  over  E  (alternatively,  just  in  case  E  is  beyond  S’s  control). 
Once again we have a match between the notions of luck and risk. The hypothesis is that                                 
events are lucky for agents because they are preceded by risk. In terms of lack of control, this can be                                       
formulated as follows: a significant event E is lucky for an agent S insofar as E is beyond S’s control.                                       
Let’s  call  this  the  luck  as  uncontrolled  risk  view  or  L-R Con   for  short.  
The fact that three intuitive ways to understand the nature of luck can be replicated with loss                                 
of plausibility as intuitive ways to understand risk, moreover, the fact that the three  main accounts of                                 
luck in the literature can be easily coupled with plausible corresponding accounts of risk suggests                             
that the luck as risk hypothesis is not a mere working hypothesis, but a very plausible way to think of                                       
10 See Broncano-Berrocal (2016) for a review of lack of control accounts of luck and Broncano-Berrocal (2015) for a                                     
defense  of  a  specific  version  of  this  kind  of  view. 
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luck. In §3 and §4, I will evaluate which of the three distinguished views (L-R Prob , L-R Mod  , and                                   
L-R Con ) is the most plausible candidate for modelling luck as a risk-involving phenomenon. But                           
before that, we need to address two potential impediments to cashing out luck in terms of risk,                                 
namely  two  intuitive  differences  between  the  two  phenomena  that  should  be  taken  into  account. 
2.  How  can  luck  be  a  risk-involving  phenomenon  if  luck  and  risk  are  different? 
The first difference, as Pritchard (2015) correctly points out, is that risk typically concerns unwanted                             
events, but luck can concern both wanted and unwanted events. Winning a prize in a raffle, for                                 
example, is lucky but not risky, because it is something (typically) wanted. In addition, Pritchard                             
thinks that a second difference has to do with the fact that we can meaningfully talk of very low                                     
levels  of  risk,  but  we  can’t  talk  of  low  levels  of  luck  in  a  meaningful  way.  
The question that naturally arises is whether these two differences are consistent with the                           
hypothesis that luck is a risk-involving phenomenon. In what follows, I will argue that the former                               
difference is compatible with the hypothesis (so we can take it into account) and that the latter is                                   
controversial  (so  we  don’t  need  to  take  it  into  account).  Let’s  start  with  the  controversial  one. 
While it is true that we talk of low levels of risk meaningfully—e.g., think of any activity that                                   
we would regard as safe but not completely exempt from potential mishaps—, it seems wrong to                               11
deny  that  talk  of  low  levels  of  luck  is  meaningful.  Consider  the  following  example: 
 
Football  Star 
Leo Messi, one of the best football players in the world (if not the best), masterfully dribbles                                 
past ten players of the opposing team. He runs at great speed towards the goal. Several                               
defenders chase him. The goalie anxiously awaits wondering from what angle the shot will                           
come, whether he should lunge left or right. Messi is determined to strike the ball to the                                 
lower-right corner of the goal. In a matter of milliseconds, he takes a look at the goalie’s                                 
position, visualizes the trajectory of the shot and raises his left foot. When he is about to                                 
strike the ball, he trips over his right foot and makes a beautiful chip shot instead. The                                 
11 An example would be vaccines. Although they entail some risks (e.g., they might have some side effects), numerous                                     
randomized, placebo-controlled trials conclude that they are safe and effective in preventing potentially deadly diseases,                             
so the benefits clearly outweigh the risks. In other words, the best available science considers vaccination a  low risk                                     
activity. 
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stumble goes unnoticed and the stadium celebrates what can be fairly considered the best                           
goal  in  the  history  of  football.  
 
Since nobody in the history of professional football has dribbled past a whole team and scored, we                                 
would not consider Messi’s play a mere matter of luck. Quite the opposite: we would deem it a very                                     
skilfull and competent performance. But since the last part of the play (i.e., the shot) involves an                                 
unnoticed stumble, we cannot objectively say that is completely exempt from luck either. The upshot                             
is that cases of very competent performances like this are such that it seems appropriate to say that                                   
they involve low levels of luck, despite the great skill displayed. Moreover, correspondingly to such                             
low levels of luck, these sorts of cases involve akin levels of risk. For example, the risk that Messi                                     
would trip over his own feet before effectively doing so was rather low (because he is unbelievably                                 
good at running fast while controlling the ball). Thus, in keeping with the luck as risk hypothesis, a                                   
low level of risk (of failing because of a stumble) precedes a corresponding low level of luck (of                                   
scoring because of a stumble). In sum, we shouldn’t be worried about Pritchard’s claim that talk of                                 
low levels of risk is meaningful but talk of low levels of luck is not: not only both are meaningful,                                       
but  they  are  also  correspondingly  related  to  each  other.   12
Let’s turn to the second difference, namely the fact that risk concerns unwanted events                           
whereas luck can concern both wanted and unwanted events. How does this difference bear on the                               
idea  that  luck  is  a  risk-involving  phenomenon?  Let’s  see  this  in  more  detail.  
It is widely agreed that in order for an agent S to be lucky with respect to the occurrence of                                       
an event E (or for E to be lucky for S) E must be significant to S, in a subjective or in an objective                                               
way, i.e., E must somehow affect S’s subjective or objective interests (e.g., one’s desires, one’s                             
12 Pritchard’s intuition that talk of low levels of luck is not meaningful is probably influenced by his own modal account                                         
of luck. In particular, he thinks that we can talk of low levels of risk when events are modally far off, but “once the                                               
non-obtaining of the target event becomes modally far off it no longer makes any sense to talk of luck” (Pritchard 2015:                                         
446). In this way, for Pritchard winning a lottery that (unbeknownst to one) has been rigged in one’s favor doesn’t count                                         
as lucky. By contrast, lack-of-control theorists have different intuitions, because insofar as one lacks control over a                                 
significant event to some degree (e.g., the outcome of a lottery, kicking a ball without stumbling) one is correspondingly                                     
lucky to the same degree. This is of course compatible with there being low levels of luck. Other views in the literature                                           
also endorse the existence of low levels of luck. For instance McKinnon (2013: 510) defends a view according to which                                       
“we attribute credit proportional to the agent’s skill, and the rest to luck”. This obviously allows for cases where low                                       
levels  of  luck  are  involved.  See  Broncano-Berrocal  (2016)  for  discussion. 
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preferences, one’s life, and so on). The same can be plausibly said about risk. S is at risk with                                     13
respect to the possible of occurrence of E (or E is risky for S) only if E is significant to S in a                                             
subjective  or  in  an  objective  sense.  
By way of illustration, think of any insignificant event, such as a leaf that is about to fall from                                     
a tree which is 1000 km away from you. Does this potential event pose any risk to you? Intuitively, it                                       
doesn’t, and the reason is that none of your interests will be affected in any relevant manner. Exactly                                   
for the same reason it wouldn’t be lucky for you either (i.e., it would be neither good nor bad luck                                       
for  you). 
With these considerations in place, we can now explain in what sense risky events are                             
negatively valenced by default: namely, in the sense that, if they materialize, the impact they have is                                 
always detrimental to our interests. Bad luck is also detrimental to our interests (otherwise it                             14
wouldn’t be described as ‘bad’). This suggests an interesting connection between risk and bad luck,                             
namely: 
Risk-Bad Luck Connection : An event E is bad luck for an agent S, only if E is risky for S and E                                           
occurs. 
Suppose that you bet your life savings on one roulette spin. You are at risk of losing them insofar as                                       
this is something that would clearly have a negative impact on your interests. Suppose further that                               
such  a  risk  materializes  and  you  lose.  This  is  bad  luck  for  you.  So  a  risk  precedes  your  bad  luck.  
The interesting question (as far as the luck as risk hypothesis is concerned) is how can                               
negatively valenced risk give rise to good luck. The answer is actually straightforward: since                           
materialized risks give rise to bad luck, risks that do not materialize give rise to good luck. In other                                     
words: 
13 This view is by Ballantyne (2012). Alternative (but more problematic) significance conditions on luck can be found in                                     
Coffman  (2007)  and  Pritchard  (2005:  132–3).  See  Broncano-Berrocal  (2016)  and  Ballantyne  (2012)  for  discussion. 
14 While the intuitive notion of risk seems inherently tied to unwanted outcomes, exposing oneself to some risks may                                     
lead to beneficial outcomes that otherwise could not be achieved. For instance, there is something intrinsically wrong                                 
about overprotective environments, namely they tend to prevent personal growth and development. By way of                             
illustration, in order to develop abilities we often need to be exposed to stressors that push us beyond our limits (e.g.,                                         
consider physical abilities). In addition, we also sometimes talk of investments as being risky (in that one might lose the                                       
amount invested), but insofar as they might produce high profits, they are typically considered ‘good’ risks. In sum, our                                     
intuitions about risk seem to be parasitic on our intuitions about what the costs and the benefits of the possible                                       
outcomes  are. 
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Risk-Good Luck Connection : An event E is good luck for an agent S, only if not-E is risky for S                                       
and  E  occurs. 
Consider the roulette example again. Suppose that you bet your life savings on one roulette spin.                               
You are at risk of losing them (i.e., you are at risk of not winning) and, again, this is detrimental to                                         
your interests. Suppose, however, that such a risk does not materialize and you win. Winning is good                                 
luck  for  you.  So  a  (negatively  valanced)  risk  precedes  your  good  luck.  
This result is unsurprising. After all, our judgments about good and bad luck are typically                             
made against a background of positive and negative expectations, i.e., with an eye on whether the                               
relevant possible outcomes (or the absence thereof) would be beneficial or detrimental to our                           
interests. The bottom line is that the crucial difference between luck and risk—namely, that risk only                               
concerns unwanted events whereas luck concerns both wanted and unwanted events—is no                       
impediment to interpreting luck as a risk-involving phenomenon. Quite the opposite: it follows                         
naturally from how we ordinarily think about the impact of materialized and unmaterialized risks on                             
our  subjective  and  objective  interests. 
L-R Prob , L-R Mod  , and L-R Con  interpret these connections between risk and good/bad luck                         
differently, insofar as they disagree on how to spell out the relevant notion of risk. In the next                                   
section, I will assess whether the probabilistic and modal interpretations can account for them. The                             
upshot  will  be  that  they  can’t. 
3.  Against  the  modal  and  probabilistic  interpretations 
Let’s start with L-R Prob . On this view, risk is a matter of probable occurrence and luck is preceded by                                     
risk  so  understood.  More  precisely,  the  relevant  notion  of  risk  featured  by  L-R Prob  is  the  following:  
Probabilistic Risk : An event E is risky for an agent S if only if E’s occurrence is probable and                                     
E  would  have  a  negative  impact  on  S’s  subjective  or  objective  interests.  
With this notion of probabilistic risk in place, L-R Prob explains  Risk-Good Luck Connection  (the thesis                             
that  S has good luck that E occurs only if not-E was risky) as follows: if S has good luck that E                                           
occurs, then not-E was probable and would have a negative impact on S’s interests. By way of                                 
illustration, suppose that you bet your life savings on one roulette spin and, luckily, you win. Your                                 
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good luck can be explained by the fact that it was probable (i.e., probabilistically risky) that you                                 
would lose and by the fact that this would have a very negative impact on your financial and personal                                     
interests.  But  since  this  risk  doesn’t  materialize,  you  are  (positively)  lucky. 
However, while the connection between good luck and probabilistic risk seems pretty                       
straightforward (I will cast doubt on this below though), it is unclear how probabilistic risk relates to                                 
bad luck. Consider  Risk-Bad Luck Connection , the thesis that S has bad luck that E occurs only if E                                     
was risky. This thesis, translated in probabilistic terms, would amount to the following: if S has bad                                 
luck that E occurs, then E was probable and would have a negative impact on S’s interests. But this                                     
tweaked  version  of  Risk-Bad  Luck  Connection  is  problematic.  Consider  the  following  two  lotteries: 
Two  Lotteries 
Lottery 1 is a standard fair lottery with long odds where only one participant wins (namely,                               
the one whose ticket number is selected). Lottery 2 is a non-standard fair lottery with the                               
same number of participants as Lottery 1, but in which the selected ticket number is the only                                 
loser, i.e., the participant in its possession is the only person who doesn’t receive a prize. In                                 
addition, suppose that losing is as negative for participants of Lottery 2 as it is for                               
participants  of  Lottery  1. 
In Lottery 1, the most probable event is that participants will lose (i.e., they are at probabilistic risk                                   
of losing). In Lottery 2, by contrast, the most probable event is that participants will win. L-R Prob and                                   
its version of  Risk-Bad Luck Connection  deliver a very counterintuitive verdict here. To see this, notice                               
that since the probability of losing Lottery 2 is so low, such an event cannot be considered risky as                                     
per L-R Prob standards. But by assumption, losing Lottery 2 is at least as bad luck (if not more) as                                     
losing Lottery 1. After all, it is very bad luck that someone loses a lottery in which nearly everyone                                     
who participates will win—in comparison to losing a lottery in which nearly everyone will lose.                             
Therefore, we have a case in which an improbable risk materializes and gives rise to bad luck. In                                   
other  words,  contrary  to  what  L-R Prob   professes,  probabilistic  risk  does  not  track  bad  luck.  
Let’s turn now to L-R Mod . This view  understands risk in terms of easily possibility of                             
occurrence and luck as preceded by this kind of risk. Here is a more precise formulation of the                                   
relevant  notion  of  modal  risk: 
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Modal Risk : An event E is risky for an agent S if only if E would occur in most nearby                                       
possible  worlds  and  E  would  have  a  negative  impact  on  S’s  subjective  or  objective  interests. 
Let’s see how L-R Mod  explains the connection between modal risk and good luck.  In brief,  Risk-Good                               
Luck Connection  would be translated as the thesis that if an event E is good luck for an agent S, then                                         
E occurs in the actual world but would fail to occur in most nearby possible worlds, which would                                   
have  a  negative  impact  on  S’s  interests.  
This tweaked version of  Risk-Good Luck Connection  seems to capture the connection between                         
risk and good luck (I will also cast doubt on this). By way of illustration, suppose that you bet your                                       
life savings on one roulette spin and, luckily, you win. In most nearby possible worlds (or in a                                   
sufficient proportion of them) you would lose. This would affect your interests negatively, but since                             
this  risk  does  not  materialize  in  the  actual  world  (because  you  win),  you  have  good  luck. 
However, as in the case of L-R Prob , it is dubious that L-R Mod  can account for the connection                                 
between risk and bad luck. Consider  Two Lotteries  again. In Lottery 1, most participants would lose in                                 
most nearby possible worlds (i.e., they are at risk of losing). In Lottery 2, by contrast, most                                 
participants would win in most nearby possible worlds. This difference makes L-R Mod and its version                             
of  Risk-Bad Luck Connection  get the wrong results. The modal risk of losing Lottery 2 is very low,                                   
almost nonexistent, given that what is easily possible is the fact that one wins. But by assumption,                                 
losing Lottery 2 is at least as bad luck (if not more) as losing Lottery 1—again, because nearly                                   
everyone who participates in Lottery 2 wins whereas nearly everyone who participates in Lottery 1                             
loses. Therefore, we have a case in which a remote possibility materializes giving rise to bad luck.                                 
This  means  that,  contrary  to  the  main  tenet  of  L-R Mod ,  modal  risk  does  not  track  bad  luck.  
The problems for L-R Prob and L-R Mod  do not end with their inability to account for the                               
connection between risk and bad luck. There is another problem in the offing. In a nutshell,                               
significant events that arise from  coincidences are paradigmatic instances of luck. But a coincidence                           
might be such that its components are at no or little risk of failing to occur (i.e., they might be very                                         
probable or modally robust). This means that there are cases of luck that involve no modal or                                 
probabilistic risk. If this mismatch is not worrisome enough, these sorts of cases also serve to show                                 
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that neither L-R Prob nor L-R Mod  can explain the connection between risk and good luck. Let’s see all                                 
this  in  more  detail.  
A coincidence is an event that cannot be explained because there is no causal or nomological                               
antecedent between its components. Suppose that you are an ice cream lover. You crave for an ice                                 15
cream, so you head to your preferred local ice-cream shop. Another person goes to the same shop.                                 
It’s scorching hot and he/she wants an ice cream to cool him/her down. While waiting in line, you                                   
strike up a conversation with this other person. You like each other. You get to know each other.                                   
You  fall  in  love.  You  live  a  long  and  happy  life  together.  
There is a causal explanation for why you go to the ice-cream shop: you are an ice cream                                   
lover and you fancy an ice cream. There is a causal explanation for why the other person goes to the                                       
ice-cream shop: it’s scorching hot and he/she wants an ice cream to cool him/her down. There is a                                   
causal explanation for why you fall in love: you like each other. However, there is no causal                                 
explanation for why you arrive simultaneously at the ice-cream shop. This is an inexplicable                           
coincidence. Unsurprisingly, meeting your life companion is very good luck for you, not only                           
because  it  is  something  tremendously  positive,  but  also  because  it  arises  out  of  a  coincidence. 
One key feature of coincidences is the following: they are no less coincidental if their                             
components are very probable or modally robust. In other words, the probabilistic or modal profile                             
of their components is completely tangential to their being coincidences: all that matters is that such                               
components have no common antecedent, i.e., that there is no causal explanation of why they                             
eventually come together. By way of illustration, suppose that you are completely determined to buy                             
an ice cream at the local ice-cream shop so that the probability that you will go there is 1 or close to                                           
1 (alternatively, there are no or few nearby possible worlds in which you would not go the ice-cream                                   
shop). Suppose that the same applies to the other person. It is still a coincidence that you both meet                                     
in the line. That you meet is obviously very good luck for you and that you didn’t would be certainly                                       
detrimental to your interests. However, note that, before getting to know each other, there was no                               
modal or probabilistic risk that you didn’t meet. To make the point more vivid, consider this other                                 
example:  16
15  See  Owens  (1992)  for  this  view. 
16  The  case  is  from  Broncano-Berrocal  (forthcoming). 
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Takeover 
For the past three months, hundreds of corporations have been secretly trying to take over                             
Sansa’s firm, an event that would have very unwelcome consequences for her workers: they                           
would be fired. Sansa knows how to stop these hostile takeovers. For any attempt, she just                               
needs to file a legal complaint via an online submission system. However, unbeknownst to                           
Sansa, there is a problem with the document targeted against the takeover attempt of                           
company number 978, the Cersei Group. An unusual interference in the data stream has                           
modified the contents of the submitted file in such a way that the competent authority has                               
received a document with so many arguments justifying the acquisition that it has decided to                             
give green light. Everybody in the company is in panic. In particular, everyone fears that they                               
will lose their jobs. However, when Cersei, the CEO of the Cersei Group, is about to seal the                                   
takeover effectively, the Stannis Group (its long-standing competitor) discloses a scandal that                       
makes Cersei’s company’s shares drop 99%—no one at the Stannis Group, not even Stannis,                           
the CEO, knows that Cersei was trying to take over Sansa’s firm. As a consequence, the                               
corporation goes bankrupt and the takeover does not succeed. In fact, it is the Stannis                             
Group that takes over Cersei’s company. The disclosure of the scandal was part of Stannis’s                             
meticulous and independent plan to bring down and take over the competition. As luck                           
would have it, it was scheduled one year ago at coincidentally the same time Cersei was about                                 
to  close  the  takeover. 
L-R Prob and L-R Mod  get the wrong results in  Takeover , because they respectively entail that if an event                                 
E is good luck for an agent, not-E was probable/would be the case in most nearby possible worlds.                                   
In  Takeover , Sansa’s workers are lucky that the takeover does not succeed and that they can keep their                                   
jobs. This is good luck for them insofar as the fact that they are not fired arises out of an                                       
inexplicable coincidence, something that is obviously positive for their interests. More specifically,                       
what is inexplicable is that the Stannis Group’s careful plan to take over Cersei's company is                               
executed at exactly the same time Cersei is about to seal the takeover of Sansa’s firm—recall that the                                   
submitted legal document that would stop the takeover suddenly changes in a way that makes                             
Cersei’s  takeover  feasible.  
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However, given how determined Stannis is to carry out his plan, it is highly probable that                               
Cersei’s takeover will not succeed and that Sansa’s workers can keep their jobs. Given such a                               
determination, this event would also occur in most nearby possible worlds. In other words, there is                               
no modal or probabilistic risk that Sansa’s workers will be fired. Since the fact that Sansa’s workers                                 
can keep their jobs is good luck for them and there is no modal or probabilistic risk involved, we                                     
cannot  but  conclude  that  modal  and  probabilistic  risk  do  not  track  good  luck.  
4.  The  lack  of  control  interpretation:  a  defense 
We have seen that neither L-R Prob nor L-R Mod  are adequate ways to model luck as a risk-involving                                 
phenomenon. A more promising candidate is L-R Con . On this view, risk is a matter of lack of control                                   
and  luck  is  understood  as  being  preceded  by  this  sort  of  risk,  namely  by  an  uncontrolled  risk : 
Uncontrolled Risk : An event E is risky for an agent S if only if E is beyond S’s control and E                                         
would  have  a  negative  impact  on  S’s  subjective  or  objective  interests. 
Consider  Two Lotteries.  Recall that Lottery 1 is a standard lottery with long odds with only one                                 
winner, while Lottery 2 is a non-standard lottery with the same number of participants but with only                                 
one loser. The participants of both lotteries lack the same degree of control over the outcomes, i.e.,                                 
the risk of losing is the same. Since the assumption was that losing would have the same negative                                   
impact on the interests of participants of Lottery 1 and 2, and the risk (i.e., the degree of lack of                                       
control over the lottery outcomes) is the same in both, participants of Lottery 1 and 2 are equally                                   
unlucky  to  lose.  L-R Con   accounts  in  this  way  for  the  connection  between  risk  and  bad  luck. 
But here is an interesting question for L-R Con . If in a lottery with long odds all participants                                 
have the same degree of control over the outcomes (viz., none), why is that we have the intuition                                   
that lottery losers are less unlucky than winners are lucky, i.e., why is that the degree of ‘luckiness’ of                                     
winning such a lottery is higher than of losing it? While the degree of lack of control over an                                     
outcome sets the baseline for how risky for a participant a possible lottery outcome is, the degree of                                   
significance that the outcome (or the absence thereof) has for the participant can dramatically                           
increase its degree of luckiness. If you participate in a standard lottery like Lottery 1 where you know                                   
that nearly everyone will lose, you won’t be very disappointed if you lose as well. Winning such a                                   
lottery, by contrast, would come with a much higher degree of significance. Consider now the                             
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opposite case, Lottery 2, where you expect that nearly everyone will win a prize. Here, it is losing                                   
that comes with a much higher degree of significance (namely, of disappointment), precisely because                           
by  buying  a  ticket  of  Lottery  2  you  basically  take  for  granted  that  you  will  get  a  prize.  
These considerations give us a more accurate idea of how degrees of luck covary with                             
degrees of risk. Recall  Relational Risk-Luck Gradability Correspondence , the thesis that the more at risk an                               
agent S is with respect to the possible occurrence of an event E, the luckier S is that E does not                                         
occur. Now that we know that degrees of luck and risk depend on degrees significance, we can                                 
formulate  two  more  specific  theses: 
Negative Significance-Luck Gradability Correspondence : The more negative the occurrence of an                     
event  E  for  agent  S  is,  the  luckier  S  is  that  E  does  not  occur.  
Positive Significance-Luck Gradability Correspondence : The more positive the occurrence of an                     
event  E  for  agent  S  is,  the  luckier  S  is  that  E  occurs. 
An  analogous  thesis  can  be  formulated  for  degrees  of  control,  on  which  degrees  of  luck  depend: 
Lack of Control-Luck Gradability Correspondence : The more an event E is beyond an agent’s (S)                             
control,  the  luckier  or  unluckier  S  is  with  respect  to  E. 
Notice that  Negative Significance-Luck Gradability Correspondence  and  Lack of Control-Luck Gradability                     
Correspondence  together specify the sense in which risk (when understood in terms of lack of control)                               
covaries with luck: namely, the more negative the occurrence of E for S is and the more E is beyond                                       
S’s control, the luckier S is that E does not occur. Consider Prchal’s lucky survival. Obviously, it                                 
would have been terribly negative for Prchal’s interests to die in the accident. This eventuality was                               
also significantly beyond his control (the elevation system of the aircraft was jammed and there was                               
nothing we could do about it). This explains why he was so lucky to survive. In this way, L-R Con can                                       
explain  the  connection  between  risk  and  good  luck. 
Finally, let’s consider  Takeover . As we have seen, the case is problematic for L-R Prob and                             
L-R Mod because it shows that there can be luck without modal or probabilistic risk. Sansa’s workers                               
are lucky not to be fired (because it is coincidental that they are not), but before being so lucky, there                                       
was no modal or probabilistic risk that they would lose their jobs—given how determined Stannis                             
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was to take over the company that was trying to take over Sansa’s firm (Cersei’s), it was actually very                                     
probable that Sansa’s workers would keep their jobs, and in no nearby possible worlds they would                               
lose them. Intuitively, however, before Stannis’s takeover was effective, Sansa’s workers were at risk                           
of losing their jobs. Otherwise how could it be explained that they panicked fearing that they would                                 
be  fired?  
L-R Con  can easily explain in what sense Sansa’s workers were at risk of becoming jobless                             
before luckily keeping their jobs in the company. In a nutshell, this eventuality was negative for them                                 
and it was something beyond their control. This is why Stannis’s takeover of Cersei’s firm was so                                 
lucky for them. In sum, L-R Con , explains the cases that are troublesome for its rivals, L-R Prob and                                 
L-R Mod . 
By way of conclusion (and in order to avoid common misunderstandings about lack of                           
control views as well as hasty objections), we can say something more about the notion of control                                 
that is relevant here. The first thing to keep in mind is that there is no unique way to control an                                         
eventuality. Consider how Sansa typically stops hostile takeovers: she files a legal complaint. Her                           
control arises from the fact that her knowledge of the law is vast. In a way, she competently brings                                     
an eventuality (viz., a possible takeover) to a desired state (viz., a frustrated takeover attempt). Now,                               
the most common way to do this is by exerting some sort of causal influence. For example, Leo                                   
Messi has control over the ball in this sense when dribbling past a whole team by moving the ball                                     
and  himself  in  certain  ways.  We  can  call  this  kind  of  control  effective  control .  
But Sansa’s or Messi’s actions are not the only ways to exert control. Consider Sansa’s                             
workers. They clearly lack control in the effective sense: they are aware that the legal complaint filed                                 
by Sansa will not work, and there is nothing in their capacity as company workers that they can do to                                       
make it work. Interestingly enough, they have no inkling about Stannis’s intervention. This leads to                             
the following idea: had they known sufficiently about it, they would have been in a position to take                                   
proper action (e.g., they could have announced the scandal themselves, made sure that Stannis’s                           
takeover  came  to  a  good  end,  and  so  on).  
This points to a second kind of control, which we may call  tracking control . It is the kind of                                     
control that a sufficiently vigilant pilot has when flying on autopilot mode. The pilot neither                             
exercises effective control (i.e., has no causal influence) over the aircraft, nor she aims to bring the                                 
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aircraft’s flight to some desired stated either. However, we cannot say that the aircraft is beyond her                                 
control, because she is in a position to exert effective control if needed (e.g., in areas of turbulences).                                 
In general, having tracking control is a matter of actively checking or monitoring whether                             17
something is in a certain desired state, in such a way that one is thereby in a position to exercise                                       
effective control over it if needed, or alternatively, to act in ways that would allow one to achieve                                   
goals related to the thing controlled (e.g., a pilot, knowing that the there is no possible way to                                   
effectively control a broken down aircraft, can grab her parachute and jump; farmers, who have no                               
effective control over the sun, can still competently count on there being enough sun the next                               
months  so  that  they  can  sow  their  crops  and  make  them  grow).  
The key point is that, depending on the practical context, one of the two forms of control                                 
will be the one needed to make oneself safe from risky eventualities. Sometimes, both are needed.                               
What I hope to have shown in this paper is that, no matter how probable, improbable, modally                                 
robust or fragile an eventuality is, if it materializes and it is bad luck for one, it is because it has a                                           
negative impact on one’s interests, but also, and more importantly, because it is beyond one’s control.                               
If it is good luck instead, it is surely because it positively affects one’s interests, but again it is due to                                         
one’s lack of control. Either way, risk, understood in this way in terms of lack of control, always                                   
precedes  luck. 
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